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lthough the EU’s CO2 Emissions Trading
Scheme is now by far the world’s largest, the
US has the distinction of having provided the seed-
bed for public policy experiments with emissions
trading. Various forms of trading were introduced
into the Clean Air Act in the 1970s;but a widely rec-
ognized success, the lead-in-gasoline phase-down
program, did not occur until the mid-1980s. Soon
thereafter proposals were put forward both for a
national cap-and-trade program to control acid rain
precursor emissions and for a similar program
(RECLAIM) in the Los Angeles air basin to deal
with persistent local pollution. The Northeastern
NOx Budget Program followed in the late 1990s, as
well as several other local programs,among them the
Chicago VOC (volatile organic compounds) pro-
gram.Finally,mercury trading and a significant tight-
ening of both the existing SO2 and NOx caps under
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) are in the off-
ing.Most of the programs implemented to date have
been considered successful, but not all.
Elements of what would now be called credit trading
were very tentatively introduced into the over-
whelmingly command-and-control structure of the
Clean Air Act beginning in the mid-1970s in the
form of netting, offsets, bubbles and banking. These
cautious experiments aimed at providing flexibility
in compliance with Clean Air Act requirements, but
the application of each was carefully circumscribed
and each trade was subject to regulatory approval.
While cost savings were achieved, the use of the
added flexibility was not widespread, and almost
always internal to one firm (Hahn 1989). The main
problem was the transaction costs involved in
demonstrating what would now be called “addition-
ality,” or, in the lingo of the day, demonstrating that
the credits being created were not “anyway tons.”
The lead phase-down program marked a step for-
ward in not requiring additionality, perhaps
because its objective was the complete elimination
of lead in gasoline. It was an averaging, or baseline-
and-credit, program in which credits were granted
to firms doing better than the rapidly declining lead
content standard (from 1.0 to 0.1 grams per leaded
gallon in three years) and usable by firms not yet
meeting the standard. In effect, it provided flexibil-
ity over time for the lumpy investments that were
required to remove lead from gasoline. Firms that
invested early were rewarded by earning credits
that could be sold to those who invested later.
Unlike credit trading within the Clean Air Act, the
lead phase-down program was widely considered a
success and provided the “break-through”in permit
trading that made the next policy experiments pos-
sible (Newell and Rogers 2004).
The US SO2Trading Program also known as the Acid
Rain Program benefited from the success of the lead
phase-down program,but also from a decade of polit-
ical stalemate over proposed, predominantly com-
mand-and-control legislation to reduce acid rain pre-
cursor emissions. For the new Republican president
in 1989, a market-based approach to an environmen-
tal problem was just right.This next step removed the
last pretense that it was the regulator who decided
the level of emissions at the level of the firm.This was
done by creating allowances,barely disguised proper-
ty rights,distributing them to emitters in amounts less
than pre-existing emissions, and allowing them to be
traded without limitation (except for a ban on bor-
rowing from future vintages). Within the limits im-
posed by the pre-existing prescriptive rules on SO2
emissions, firms were free to choose their level of
emissions and their method of abatement subject
only to the requirement to surrender an allowance
for every ton emitted. Effectively, a scarcity was
imposed by the cap, while the ability to trade created
the potential for a market that would provide a price
that could be used by firms in deciding what abate-
ment would be worth undertaking.The hope was that
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Few doubted that the program would be effective in
achieving the intended 50 percent reduction in SO2
emissions. However, during the debate on the legis-
lation in 1989–90 and in the years prior to imple-
mentation in 1995,there was considerable doubt that
a market would emerge. The program applied only
to electric utilities, which were viewed as conserva-
tive, price-regulated entities lacking an effective
incentive to maximize profits. It was thought that
they would readily trade internally among power
plants they owned, but not externally with other
electric utilities. Cost savings would occur within
firms,but the larger savings available from inter-util-
ity trading would not be realized. While most early
compliance plans conformed to this expectation,
market intermediaries quickly appeared and started
to arbitrage the inter-company differences in mar-
ginal cost. The market developed with sufficient
rapidity to cause a well-defined single price to
appear before the program started in 1995.And, the
volume of trading within a year or two made it clear
that there was plenty of inter-utility trading
(Ellerman et al. 2000).
To the surprise of many and despite a barely con-
straining initial cap, the sub-set of emissions includ-
ed in an initial transitional phase dropped by almost
50 percent in the first year of the program. This
unprecedented emission reduction solidly estab-
lished the reputation of emissions trading as a means
of reducing emissions quickly, as had been first
demonstrated with the lead phase-down program.
The reduction was the more impressive in that it was
entirely voluntary in response to the possibility of
banking early reductions to reduce the cost of the
later more stringent cap. As such, it provided clear
evidence that economic incentives worked (Eller-
man 2004).Thereafter, the SO2 program became the
“poster child” of emissions trading and fully earned
the epithets of “grand policy experiment”and “living
legend” that have been bestowed upon it (Stavins
1998; Burtraw and Palmer 2004).
At approximately the same time as the US SO2
Trading Program was being developed, air quality
authorities in the Los Angeles air basin decided to
adopt a cap-and-trade approach to replace a detailed
but infeasible command-and-control plan to further
reduce local SO2 and NOx emissions to address per-
sistent local air quality problems.The result was the
two separate programs known as RECLAIM that
came into effect in 1994 (Harrison 2004).These two
programs are noteworthy for several reasons. They
applied to sources across several industries. They
introduced a form of spatial differentiation into trad-
ing.And they provided the first of many instances in
which air quality regulators,who possess ample legal
authority to implement a command-and-control pro-
gram,would choose to refocus efforts on designing a
market-based system that would provide appropri-
ate incentives for the desired abatement, and there-
by overcome the informational asymmetries and
political resistance that were increasingly rendering
prescriptive regulation less effective.
The NOx part of the RECLAIM program encoun-
tered significant difficulties in 2000–01 that led to its
partial suspension. In brief, the price of permits
soared from less than $5,000/ton to more than
$90,000/ton in the space of a few months; some
sources were unable to acquire permits at any price;
a $15,000/ton fine for non-compliance was imple-
mented retroactively; and electric utility sources
were separated from other sources and subjected to
prescriptive regulation mandating the installation of
NOx removal equipment before being reintegrated
into the program several years later. The causes of
this break-down are essentially two: the absence of
banking or borrowing and the highly unusual conflu-
ence of events surrounding the California electricity
crisis in 2000–01. The latter placed extraordinary
demand upon a set of old, generating units without
NOx controls that had previously been used for only
a few hours a year to meet peak demand.The inabil-
ity to bank or borrow made it impossible to meet the
extraordinary demand for permits within the one-
year compliance period in a program that was also
small in its geographic scope. The effect of this tem-
poral constraint was clearly signaled by forward
prices that were significantly lower than current com-
pliance period prices and which reflected the ability
to retrofit NOx control equipment with sufficient
time and the expected passing of the unusual events
of 2000–01. The unavoidable result was the break-
down of the trading program and the temporary
return to more conventional prescriptive measures.
The Northeastern NOx Budget Program lagged the
national SO2 and the RECLAIM programs slightly
in its development and implementation; however,
when it started in 1999, it provided yet more evi-
dence of the turn towards the use of cap-and-trade
mechanisms to deal with air quality issues. As was
CESifo DICE Report 4/2007 14
ForumCESifo DICE Report 4/2007 15
Forum
the case with RECLAIM, the air quality regulators
possessed the legal authority under the Clean Air
Act to mandate appropriate measures, but they
turned instead to a market-based approach as more
effective and efficient.The distinctive feature of the
Northeastern NOx Budget Program is that it was an
interstate agreement to establish a common emis-
sions market to deal with a problem that was the
responsibility of each state but which was in large
part caused by out-of-state sources (Aulisi et al.
2005). The federal Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA) assigned NOx “budgets” to each state and
operated the registries, but enforcement and the
allocation of allowances to sources within the state
were the responsibility of each state.The program is
also important in introducing an element of time dif-
ferentiation; the cap applies only during the months
from May through September when the meteorolog-
ical conditions conducive to ozone formation are
present in the Northeast.
The Northeastern NOx Budget Program provided
the foundation for what was to be the most radical
and telling (if unheralded) change in air quality reg-
ulation in the United States, the NOx SIP Call. The
acronym SIP stands for State Implementation Plan,
which is the detailed source-specific set of regula-
tions that prescribes air emission limits on all sources
within the state in order to attain or to maintain the
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS)
for specified pollutants.As such, it is the heart of the
command-and-control approach of air quality regu-
lation that had become the norm with the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970. In response to a tighten-
ing of the NAAQS for ozone in the late 1990s, the
EPA offered the affected states the option of either
submitting a conventional prescriptive SIP to EPA
for approval or accepting an EPA-determined state
budget and adopting the “Model Rule” that would
allow trading among all sources in the multi-state
region. Every state chose the latter option and thus
was born in 2003–04 what is now called simply the
NOx Budget Program, which extends well beyond
the Northeast to include all sources east of the Great
Plains. In offering this choice and in accepting it,
both the federal EPA and the state air quality regu-
lators recognized and acknowledged the limits of the
traditional prescriptive form of regulation.
The Chicago VOC program was a local application
of cap-and-trade, like RECLAIM, and like the NOx
programs, it aimed at ozone attainment, but it tar-
geted a different set of ozone precursor emissions:
volatile organic compounds. As such, it was another
first,but it is also notable in being judged largely a fail-
ure, at least in its initial form. Firms complied with the
program, which went into effect in 2000, but there
were some remarkable anomalies that indicated some-
thing was amiss, such as a positive price and expiring,
unused banked allowances. The problem was a set of
prescriptive hazardous air pollutant (HAP) regula-
tions that had gone into effect at the same time con-
cerning the same set of emissions. The interaction of
the two instruments meant that some installations
were constrained by the HAP regulations and others
by the VOC trading program. The latter bought
allowances, but the former did not always sell their
excess allowance holdings and tended simply to ignore
the market possibilities. The authors of the definitive
study of this program describe it as market-based
“window dressing” for a dense set of traditional regu-
latory measures that did the real work (Kosobud et al.
2006).Using two instruments to achieve the same goal
provided some flexibility to a few participants but suc-
ceeded mainly in adding cost.
Although debate now focuses on cap-and-trade pro-
posals to limit greenhouse gas emissions, it would be
a mistake to omit the further extensions of emissions
trading that will take effect in 2009–10 as a result of
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and the Clean
Air Mercury Rule (CAMR).Both have followed the
regulatory route pioneered by the NOx SIP Call
whereby federal approval of the state’s implementa-
tion plan can be obtained by accepting the EPA-
determined state budget and the trading rules set out
in the respective Model Rules (Napolitano et al.
2007).In the case of CAIR,the SO2 and NOx caps in
the existing SO2 Trading and NOx Budget Programs
are being effectively reduced by about two-thirds
over a five year period in order to address persistent
ozone non-attainment and the new fine particulate
standards. In the case of the mercury rule, a new
emissions trading program is being set up to limit
power plant emissions of a quasi-global pollutant
that has been previously unregulated. These mea-
sures were implemented by administrative rule by
the Bush Administration and they have gone virtual-
ly unnoticed by all but the parties involved.
The lack of controversy over the CAIR and CAMR
contrasts markedly with the debate concerning
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading proposals
now under consideration in Congress. After what
would seem like an almost triumphal march of near
universal acceptance of cap-and-trade systems fordealing with challenging air quality problems, the
whole concept is now being called into question with
serious and well-meaning suggestions that alternative
regulatory approaches may be more appropriate for
GHG emissions. The contrasting reception of CAIR
and the climate proposals is the more striking in that,
when emissions trading emerged as a viable and prac-
ticable regulatory instrument in the 1990s, it was seen
as applicable mostly to new problems that were not
covered by the existing air quality regulation under
the Clean Air Act. In fact, since then, it has proven
harder to extend emissions trading to new problems,
such as climate, than it has been to apply emissions
trading to air quality problems falling squarely within
the ambit of the Clean Air Act, perhaps because the
legal authority and conventional prescriptive alterna-
tives existed as an always present alternative.
If the time has not already arrived, the implementa-
tion of CAIR will soon create a situation where the
extensive apparatus of prescriptive regulation of SO2
and NOx emissions from stationary sources will be
redundant. Emissions from any given source will be
determined by the cost of the respective allowances
instead of the increasingly archaic prescriptive regula-
tions that tell firms to do what they would do anyway
as a result of the high price on emissions.
Whether the trend to increasing reliance on market
incentives instead of prescriptive regulation will hold
for greenhouse gases is the issue now being joined.As
of this writing there is no cap-and-trade system for
CO2 or GHG’s in existence in the US, although the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is scheduled to
start operating in 2009 if by then a sufficient number
of Northeastern states adopt the proposed regulations,
as they say they will. California’s legislature and gov-
ernor have empowered a regulatory agency to issue
regulations to take effect in 2012 that would return the
state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, but it is
almost certain that emissions trading will play only a
partial role, probably restricted to electric utilities and
perhaps some industrial facilities. Meanwhile, the
more important and real debate is being engaged at
the federal level, where several serious proposals to
cap GHG emissions starting in 2012 are under consid-
eration in the Congress.There are,however,significant
differences concerning major design features among
proposals and their supporters that will require a num-
ber of years to reconcile. The debate will be difficult
and protracted,and the outcome is uncertain.It seems
unlikely, but it would be the supreme irony if the calls
for an alternative “simpler” approach are heeded, ig-
noring the lessons from America’s extensive experi-
ence with emissions trading and leaving Europe alone
as the champion of a global GHG trading system.
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